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THE SUPREME COURT- LEADING CASES
may be all that is necessary to make that silence a silence for prayer.
If not, the teacher's answer - "Certainly, that's why we have the
silence," or "That's what you're supposed to do" - could easily have
the same effect. A statutory moment of silence creates a vessel into
which the contents of prayer and religious preference are all too easily
poured. Even in the absence of a searching purpose inquiry, the
Lemon-mandated effect analysis, properly applied, should be sufficient
to overturn moment-of-silence statutes.
E. Freedom of Speech, Press, and Association
I. Attorney Advertising. - Eight years ago, in Bates v. State
Bar,' the Supreme Court held that attorneys have a first amendment
right to advertise prices for certain routine legal services. 2 Subsequent
decisions sharpened the boundaries of permissible state regulation of
attorney advertising and solicitation 3 but left many issues unresolved.
Last Term, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,4 the Court
decided some of these questions, holding that although a state may
not discipline attorneys for running newspaper advertisements that
contain nondeceptive illustrations or legal advice, it may require at-
torneys who advertise to disclose information relating to their fee
arrangements. Although the decision lengthened the list of permissible
forms of attorney advertising, the Court remained reluctant to grant
such advertising the same degree of first amendment protection af-
forded other commercial speech.
In the spring of 1982, Philip Zauderer, an Ohio attorney, pub-
lished an advertisement that featured a drawing of a Dalkon Shield
Intrauterine Device and asked the reader, "DID YOU USE THIS
IUD?" The advertisement also advised that it was not too late for
women who had been harmed by the Dalkon Shield to sue the device's
manufacturer and that Zauderer would represent women in such
cases on a contingent-fee basis.5 The Ohio Supreme Court's Office of
Disciplinary Counsel filed a complaint charging that this and another 6
' 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
2 Id. at 384.
- See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206-07 (1982) (unanimous Court) (holding that a
state may not discipline an attorney for failing to use state-approved terminology to advertise
his practice); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 467-68 (1978) (unanimous Court)
(upholding sanctions against an attorney who engaged in in-person solicitation); In re Primus,
436 U.S. 412, 439 (1978) (7-1 decision) (holding that a reprimand of an ACLU attorney who
solicited a client by mail in order to achieve political objectives violated rights of free association
and expression).
4 1o5 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
5 See id. at 2271-72.
6 The Office of Disciplinary Counsel also recommended that Zauderer be reprimanded for
having published an advertisement in which he offered to represent defendants in drunk driving
cases on a contingent-fee basis. The Office contended that the advertisement proposed an illegal
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advertisement violated Ohio's code of legal ethics. 7 Adopting the find-
ings of a panel of its Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline, the Supreme Court of Ohio publicly reprimanded Zauderer.
The court held that the Dalkon Shield advertisement was imper-
missible because it featured an illustration, included legal advice, and
failed to disclose a client's possible liability for costs even if she lost
her suit.8
The United States Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed
in part. Justice White, writing for the majority,9 began by reaffirming
that the first amendment protects commercial speech, although to a
lesser extent than noncommercial speech. 1° According to Justice
White, government may freely ban commercial speech that is "false,
deceptive, or misleading" or that "proposes an illegal transaction," but
may restrict nondeceptive speech concerning lawful activities "only in
the service of a substantial governmental interest, and only through
means that directly advance that interest."'"
Justice White then addressed the portion of Zauderer's Dalkon
Shield advertisement that advised women that their claims might not
be time-barred.' 2 Because this legal advice was neither false nor
deceptive, 13 the Court required the state to show that its restriction
transaction because state law prohibited attorneys from representing criminal defendants on a
contingent-fee basis. See id. at 2271-72. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed that the advertise-
ment was deceptive, but based its conclusion on a theory not advanced by the Office. Following
the report of its Board of Commissioners, the court found the advertisement deceptive because
it failed to mention that a client could plead guilty to a lesser offense and still be liable for
attorney fees; under the contingent-fee arrangement, legal fees would be waived only if the
client were convicted of drunken driving. See id. at 2273-74. On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, Zauderer argued unsuccessfully that the Ohio court's adoption of this view
violated his due process rights because he had not had an opportunity to introduce evidence to
contest the new theory. See id. at 2283-84. Only Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
concluded that Zauderer had been denied procedural due process on this count. See id. at
2292-94 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7 See io5 S. Ct. at 2272-73.
8 See id. at 2274. The Ohio Supreme Court also held that Zauderer had violated the state's
rule against "recommending employment of himself as a private practitioner to a non-lawyer
who had not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer." Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Zauderer, io Ohio St. 3d 44, 46, 461 N.E.2d 883, 886 (1984).
9 Justice White's opinion was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens. Justice Brennan,
joined by Justice Marshall, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, also filed an opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part. Justice Powell did not participate in the decision.
10 See lo5 S. Ct. at 2274-75 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 6o
(1983)).
1 Id. at 2275 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557 (I98o))-
12 Four other Justices joined the portion of Justice White's opinion holding that the first
amendment protects attorney advertisements containing legal advice. Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor dissented from this holding.
13 Ohio had stipulated that the advice was neither false nor deceptive. See Io5 S. Ct. at
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directly advanced a substantial governmental interest. 14 Neither of
the state's asserted interests satisfied the Court. Justice White first
rejected the state's claim that a ban on attorney advertising containing
legal advice was necessary to prevent coercion of prospective clients. 15
He distinguished Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,16 which up-
held restrictions on in-person solicitation by attorneys; he argued that
printed advice, unlike in-person solicitation, does not invade a reader's
privacy, lacks the coercive influence of the physical presence of a
"trained advocate," and does not press the prospective client for an
immediate, on-the-spot answer. 17 Second, Justice White rejected the
argument that the prevention of meritless litigation could justify a ban
on printed legal advice. He observed that free access to the courts is
a valuable asset of our system of justice: "we cannot endorse the
proposition that a lawsuit, as such, is an evil." Is Finally, Justice
White dismissed the state's argument that the administrative difficul-
ties in distinguishing truthful from deceptive legal advice justified a
flat ban on all advertising containing legal advice. He rejected the
contention that the accuracy of legal advertising would be more dif-
ficult to assess than that of other commercial advertising. 19
The Court followed a parallel line of analysis in invalidating Ohio's
ban on illustrations in attorney advertising. Asserting that the state
must demonstrate that the ban directly advanced a substantial gov-
ernmental interest, Justice White questioned the significance of the
state's interest in prohibitions designed to preserve the dignity of the
bar and rejected the claim that a "prophylactic rule" was needed to
maintain standards of propriety or to prevent deception. According
to the majority, a blanket ban was unnecessary because state regula-
tory agencies could identify undignified or deceptive visual advertis-
ing. 20
Having struck down two of the grounds for Zauderer's reprimand,
the Court sustained the state's requirement that Zauderer disclose that
clients might have to pay costs even if their Dalkon Shield suits
2276. Justice White remarked that the advice was entirely accurate because in Ohio and many
other jurisdictions a cause of action for latent injury or disease does not accrue until the plaintiff
discovers the harm. See id. at 2276-77 & n.i (citing O'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 4 Ohio
St. 3d 84, 90, 447 N.E.2d 727, 732 (1983)).
14 See io5 S. Ct. at 2277.
Is See id.
16 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
17 105 S. Ct. at 2277.
Is Id. at 2278.
19 See id. at 2278-So. The Court also noted that the American Bar Association agrees that
it is "neither impractical nor unduly burdensome" to separate truthful legal advertising from
deceptive advertising. Id. at 2279 n.13.
20 See id. at 2280-81. All seven of the other participating Justices joined this portion of
Justice White's opinion.
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failed. 21 Justice White reasoned that Zauderer's first amendment in-
terest in withholding commercial information was less significant than
his interest in disseminating such information, because constitutional
protection for commercial speech largely grows out of the consumer's
right to know, not the vendor's right to sell his wares. 22 Accordingly,
the Court adopted a standard of review more relaxed than the general
requirement that restrictions on commercial speech directly serve a
substantial state interest. The majority held that Ohio's disclosure
requirements need only be "reasonably related" to the state's interest
in preventing the deception of consumers. 23 Noting the likelihood
that potential clients would misinterpret Zauderer's promise not to
charge a fee to mean that he would not bill them for costs, Justice
White concluded that the disclosure requirement was reasonably re-
lated to prevention of deception. 24
Justice Brennan concurred with those portions of the Court's opin-
ion holding that a state may not discipline attorneys for including
illustrations or legal advice in their advertising. 25 He dissented, how-
ever, from the holding that Ohio could discipline Zauderer for failing
to disclose details of his fee arrangements. Although he agreed with
the majority that states may promulgate narrow disclosure rules to
prevent confusion between fees and CoSts, 2 6 he argued that all regu-
lation of commercial speech, whether through disclosure rules or pro-
hibitions, must "directly" advance a "substantial interest." 27 In Justice
21 See id. at 2281-83. Five other Justices joined this part of Justice White's opinion, with
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting.
22 See id. at 2282 (citing Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)). Justice White also noted that Zauderer's first amendment interest
in withholding commercial information was significantly weaker than the interest of noncom-
mercial speakers in refusing to express beliefs they do not hold. See id. Specifically, Justice
White distinguished a case in which a party sought to require a newspaper to publish a reply
to its editorials, see Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), as well as cases
in which states sought to force citizens to express an ideological belief on their license plates,
see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (I977), or to force a student to recite the pledge of
allegiance, see West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
23 See io5 S. Ct. at 2282. In a footnote, the Court turned aside the suggestion that strict
scrutiny should apply to disclosure requirements, noting that the right of a commercial speaker
to withhold accurate factual information is not a fundamental right and that past Court decisions
have in fact "recommended" disclosure requirements as one of the less restrictive alternatives to
suppression of speech. Id. at 2282 n.14.
24 See id. at 2283.
25 See id. at 2284-85 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26 See id. at 2287.
27 Id. at 2285 & n.i. While acknowledging that the difference between rules requiring
disclosure and rules requiring suppression of commercial speech "supports some differences in
analysis," Justice Brennan argued that the Court "greatly overstate[d]" the distinction. Id. at
2285 n.i. Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that strict scrutiny, which requires regu-
lations to be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest, does not apply
to commercial disclosure requirements. See id. at 2286 n.2.
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Brennan's view, Ohio's requirement that Zauderer specify a particular
contingent-fee percentage rate did not directly advance the state's
concededly substantial interest in preventing deception, because the
state had failed to introduce evidence of a single instance in which
omission of fee rates had been misleading. 28 Moreover, the disclosure
rule was unduly burdensome because it compelled Zauderer 'fully to
disclose"29 the terms of his fee arrangements - a wording which, if
taken "seriously," would require the publication of detailed fee infor-
mation that would fill much more space than the advertisement it-
self.30 Even if the state's disclosure rule were meant to be more
narrowly construed, Justice Brennan argued, it was far too vague to
give Zauderer fair notice of his disclosure obligations and therefore
violated both due process and the first amendment. 31
Justice O'Connor also filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part. She dissented only from the holding that states
may not prohibit advertisements that contain unsolicited legal advice.
She argued that such advertising creates an enhanced risk of deception
and that an attorney's self-interest may "color the advice" offered in
the advertisement. Justice O'Connor stressed that "[1]awyers are
professionals, and as such they have greater obligations. "32
The majority opinion in Zauderer wisely recognized that prohibi-
tions on the use of illustrations and legal advice in attorney advertising
would serve no substantial state interest. The Court declined, how-
ever, to go further and acknowledge that no restriction on nondecep-
tive and noncoercive attorney advertising can advance a substantial
governmental interest. By limiting its holding to the specific adver-
tising techniques before it - implying that other methods, such as
the undignified "hard sell," might still be prohibited - and by failing
to reject traditional, unpersuasive rationales for restrictions on attor-
ney advertising, the Court in effect left a heavier burden on the
28 See id. at 2287.
29 Id. (quoting Zauderer, io Ohio St. 3d at 48, 461 N.E.2d 883, 886 (984)) (emphasis added
by Justice Brennan).
30 See id. at 2288-89 & n.6. Justice Brennan also suggested that the absence of comparably
burdensome disclosure requirements for other fee arrangements in Ohio implied that contingent-
fee advertising was being "impermissibly singled out for onerous treatment." Id. at 2289 n.7
(citations omitted).
31 See id. at 2289-92. According to Justice Brennan, before Zauderer published his Dalkon
Shield advertisement he asked state authorities whether it would violate state ethical guidelines,
but they refused to offer an advisory opinion. Even after full disciplinary hearings, the Ohio
Supreme Court did not specify exactly what disclosures were required. See id. at 2289. Justice
Brennan also remarked on the majority's concession that the disclosure requirements might have
raised a significant due process issue had Zauderer been disbarred rather than reprimanded.
Justice Brennan argued that a public reprimand also implicated Zauderer's due process rights
because it amounted to a potentially grave deprivation of Zauderer's liberty and property
interests in his professional reputation. See id. at 2291-92 & n.i6.
32 Id. at 2294-95 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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commercial speech of lawyers than on other forms of commercial
speech. The Court's reluctance to extend its holding to all nondecep-
tive and noncoercive attorney advertising might have been more un-
derstandable had it not also established a standard of review that
broadly applies to all laws requiring disclosure in advertising, not just
to rules requiring disclosures in attorney advertising. This relaxed
standard of review, together with the majority's approval of Ohio's
vague disclosure requirement, suggests that the Court underestimates
the chilling effect of disclosure regulations.
Although the Court did bury one of the most persistent and least
convincing objections to attorney advertising - the contention that
advertising stirs up frivolous litigation 33 - the Court otherwise
seemed reluctant to reject unpersuasive rationales for restrictions. The
majority, for example, did not respond to Justice O'Connor's conten-
tion that legal advertising is unnecessary because citizens have alter-
native sources of information about their legal rights. 34 The Court
could easily have rebutted this argument by observing that states allow
other advertising despite the existence of alternative sources of com-
mercial information or by pointing to the strong evidence that "people
don't know where to turn when they need a lawyer. '35
The majority also declined to answer Justice O'Connor's argument
that lawyers should not include legal advice in their advertising be-
cause they will "present that advice most likely to bring potential
clients into the office, rather than that advice which it is most in the
interest of potential clients to hear."'36 This contention simply points
to the risk that lawyers will run deceptive or misleading advertise-
ments; it is not an independent justification for a ban. There is no
reason to suppose that accurate advice in an advertisement gives rise
to a greater conflict of interest than accurate advice in any other phase
of an attorney-client relationship. The Court's failure to foreclose
Justice O'Connor's argument may leave room for states to claim that
other kinds of advertising - for example, advertising that contains
fee information - create an inherent conflict of interest.
In addition, the Court failed to reject Ohio's argument that its
interest in preserving the dignity of its bar justified restrictions on
advertisements; instead, the majority said only that it was "unsure"
whether this rationale would ever justify regulation. 3 7 Undignified
publicity is sometimes the only way to inform citizens of their legal
rights. Whereas Zauderer's arguably tasteless Dalkon Shield adver-
33 See 1o5 S. Ct. at 2278.
34 See id. at 2297 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35 Andrews, The Model Rules and Advertising, 68 A.B.A. J. 8o8, 809 (1982).
36 105 S. Ct. at 2296 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7 o5 S. Ct. at 2280.
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tisement attracted over 2oo inquiries and led to io6 lawsuits,38 some
of which may have been meritorious claims, the unillustrated, pre-
sumably more dignified version of his advertisement attracted no
clients. 3 9 Although states have a valid interest in protecting consum-
ers from incompetent, overreaching, or dishonest lawyers, 40 the desire
to preserve the status or self-image of the profession cannot justify
abridgement of unseemly or unbecoming speech. 4 1 Far from under-
mining the effectiveness of the profession, attorney advertising may
improve legal services by increasing competition and reducing prices. 42
A ban on truthful but undignified advertising might harm consumers
by denying them helpful information about their rights and about the
market for legal help.
Finally, by apparently limiting its holding to printed advertising, 43
the Zauderer Court declined to establish that lawyers' use of television
advertising falls within the purview of the first amendment. A more
recent Supreme Court decision, Humphrey v. Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association,44 none-
theless suggests that the Court is prepared to extend first amendment
protection to television advertising by attorneys. In Humphrey, the
Court summarily vacated an Iowa Supreme Court decision enjoining
the broadcast of nondeceptive television advertisements by lawyers
and remanded the case for consideration in light of Zauderer. The
reasoning behind Zauderers holding that states cannot ban illustra-
tions in attorney advertising - that states can distinguish deceptive
from nondeceptive uses of "visual media in advertising"45 - should
extend to attorney advertising through all forms of visual media, not
just printed illustrations. The FTC and similar state agencies already
33 See id. at 2272.
39 See Stewart, Lawyer Wins Advertising Case, But Reprimand Sticks, A.B.A. J., Aug.
1985, at 84, 84.
40 See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 467-68 (1978) (holding that a
state may discipline a lawyer for in-person solicitation of clients under potentially coercive
circumstances).
41 See Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel
Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1x81, 1,89-90 (972); cf. Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar
Associations and Courts, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 329 (1970) ("It is likely that the real
beneficiaries of a 'dignified' legal profession are the lawyers instead of the clients.").
42 See Note, supra note 41, at 12o6-o8.
43 The Court confined its endorsement of solicitation containing legal advice to "printed
advertising." io5 S. Ct. at 2280. Although the Court also approved Zauderer's use of a
"nondeceptive illustration," id. at 2281, it did not specify whether it considered a television
image an "illustration." Justice O'Connor, writing separately, said that "'advertising on the
electronic broadcast media will warrant special consideration.'" Id. at 2294 n.i (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (,977)).
44 i05 S. Ct. 2693 (1985) (mem.), vacating 355 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1984).
45 1o5 S. Ct. at 2281.
1985]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
regulate deceptive broadcast advertisements for a broad range of prod-
ucts and services; 46 there is no reason to suppose that regulatory
agencies cannot also distinguish visually deceptive attorney advertising
from nondeceptive attorney advertising. Indeed, lawyers often cast
their television advertisements in simple, straightforward terms;47 in
many cases it may be easier to identify deceptive attorney advertising
than to identify deceptive commercial advertising. Nonetheless, the
Zauderer Court passed up an opportunity to clarify that first amend-
ment protection extends to broadcast attorney advertising and, more
generally, to establish that prevention of deception or coercion is the
only state interest sufficiently substantial to justify restrictions on
attorney advertising.
The Court's reluctance to extend appropriate first amendment pro-
tection to attorney advertising stands in contrast to its unhesitating
adoption of a relaxed standard of review for all rules requiring dis-
closure of information in advertising, not just those directed at attor-
ney advertising. The Court's holding that disclosure rules need only
be "reasonably related" to an important goal - based on the argument
that disclosure rules are less objectionable than prohibitions because
they provide the public with more rather than less information -
misconceives the first amendment interests of commercial speakers
and consumers. An advertiser may find disclosure requirements more
expensive or burdensome than censorship; it may well be easier for
an attorney to delete a misleading word than to explain all the details
of fee arrangements. 48 In addition, a consumer may find a disclosure
rule less helpful than a ban on advertising, because exhaustive dis-
claimers and warnings may mean little to, and may even confuse, an
unsophisticated buyer. Certainly states may in some circumstances
constitutionally require attorneys to disclose specific information in
order to prevent deception of potential clients. But, as with any
regulation of commercial speech, the Court in Zauderer should have
required Ohio to show that its disclosure requirement directly ad-
vanced its interest in preventing deception.
That the majority approved Ohio's fee disclosure requirement sug-
gests that the Court does not fully perceive the chilling effect of vague
disclosure rules. Justice White argued plausibly that states could
46 See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 390 (x965) (upholding FTC's
finding that a television advertiser's use of an undisclosed mock-up in a shaving-cream dem-
onstration was deceptive).
47 See, e.g., Middleton, The Right Way to Advertise on TV, 69 A.B.A. J. 893, 894 (1983)
(reporting that Hyatt Legal Services, which advertises more than any law firm in the country,
projects a "'low-key'" message that "tells consumers, 'We can handle simple matters effec-
tively.'").
49 See 1O5 S. Ct. at 2288 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that a rule requiring full disclosure of all relevant fee information would impose an intolerable
burden on attorneys who advertise).
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require attorneys to explain that contingent-fee clients would always
be liable for costs, but the majority glossed over the imprecision of
the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion, which seemed to require full ex-
planation of a lawyer's fee arrangements - an extremely burdensome
task49 - and which "punished Zauderer for violating requirements
that did not exist prior to this disciplinary proceeding."50 The major-
ity's only defense for what it termed this "unfortunate" vagueness -
that Ohio had reprimanded rather than disbarred Zauderer5 l - ig-
nored the harshness of a reprimand that was published in statewide
legal journals and reports.5 2
If the opinion reflected an overly indulgent view of vaguely-worded
disclosure rules, the majority nonetheless did not endorse burdensome
disclosure regulations requiring "extensive disclosure of all relevant
liability rules,"' 3 as Justice O'Connor suggested it had. Justice White
narrowly construed the Ohio court's decision as requiring an attorney
only to clarify that contingent-fee plaintiffs would be liable for costs
even if their suits failed, not as requiring an attorney to divulge every
conceivable detail relating to fee arrangements.5 4 The Court reaf-
firmed that "unduly burdensome" disclosure rules might violate the
first amendment.5 5
Whereas the Court's deferential standard for disclosure rules at
least treats all advertisers equally, the Court's reluctance to dismiss
traditional objections to attorney advertising treats the commercial
speech of lawyers as different from that of other citizens. Lawyers,
unlike other advertisers, may hesitate to use television, or to publish
accurate but aggressive printed advertisements, because they fear the
possibility of sanctions. Similarly, the Court's approach may allow
states to continue to require lawyers, unlike other advertisers, to
adhere to standards of "dignity" and orthodoxy - rules that have
been and will continue to be used to harass unorthodox or unpopular
attorneys.5 6 The Court's hesitance to put lawyers on the same footing
49 See id. at 2288 & n.6.
5) Id. at 2291.
51 See 1o5 S. Ct. at 2283 n.15.
52 See id. at 2291 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53 Id. at 2297 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54 See 1O5 S. Ct. at 2283.
55 Id. at 2282.
56 See Comment, supra note 41, at 312-14 (1970) (arguing that the established bench and
bar have frequently used vague disciplinary rules to discipline unpopular or unorthodox attor-
neys); Comment, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Bar Disciplinary Proceedings:
What Ever Happened to Spevak?, 23 VILL. L. REv. 127, 135-36 (x977). Zauderer himself may
have been singled out for especially harsh treatment. "No member of the general public has
ever complained . . . about Zauderer's Dalkon Shield advertisement. ... Instead, the [state]
filed its charges only as a result of complaints received from other attorneys - including the
local counsel for A.H. Robins Company, manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield." lo5 S. Ct. at
229o n.ii (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
1985] 201
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
as other commercial speakers contrasts with its decision last Term in
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,57 in which the Court held
that the privileges and immunities clause forbids a state to impose
residency requirements on members of its bar.5 8 Although Piper might
be read as simply prohibiting discrimination against nonresidents, the
case also suggests that states may not discriminate against lawyers. 59
A consistent first amendment jurisprudence would similarly prevent
states from holding the speech of lawyers to a stricter standard than
is applied to speech by any other group.
The Court's reluctance is also unfortunate because it effectively
impedes the flow of valuable information to people in need of legal
help. Ultimately, the first amendment interests of lawyers who wish
to advertise protect the public's more significant first amendment right
to know. Attorney advertising can provide people with information
about the market for legal services, data that could help people find
legal counsel and lead to "lower priced services of better quality. '60
Public interest lawyers favor attorney advertising because they believe
it will "provide middle income individuals with greater access to legal
services. "61
To be sure, by approving the use of illustrations and legal advice,
the Court in Zauderer has taken a significant step toward full recog-
nition of the first amendment protection to which attorney advertising
is entitled. Indeed, there is every reason to expect that as attorneys
continue to challenge state laws against undignified or broadcast ad-
vertising, the Court will eventually permit all forms of attorney ad-
vertising that are not misleading or coercive. 62 For the time being,
however, the Court seems to be moving toward proper protection of
attorney advertising in a hesitant, case-by-case fashion.
2. Public Forum Doctrine. - Nearly half a century ago, in Hague
v. CIO,' the Supreme Court held that the first amendment requires
57 IO5 S. Ct. 1272 (1985).
58 Id. at 128o.
59 Cf. id. at 1278 (holding that a lawyer cannot be denied the protections of the privileges
and immunities clause on the grounds that a lawyer is an officer of the state).
60 Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, Why Lawyers Should be Allowed to Advertise: A Market
Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1084, 1109 (1983).
61 Id. at 1111 (citation omitted).
62 For example, the Court recently declined to review a state court decision that, while
sustaining the suspension of an attorney who included misleading statements in a direct-mail
solicitation, nonetheless held that direct-mail solicitation of clients is entitled to some first
amendment protection. See Committee on Professional Standards v. Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d
163, r68, 170, 470 N.E.2d 838, 840, 841, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40, 43 (1984), cert. denied, 1o5 S. Ct.
2701 (1985). Last Term, the Court also vacated a judgment upholding a ban on television
advertising by attorneys. See Humphrey v. Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of
the Iowa State Bar Ass'n, 105 S. Ct. 2693 (1985) (mene.), vacating 255 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 5984).
1 307 U.S. 496 (1939)-
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